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Abstract 
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stability, the study examines the impact of greater bank disclosure in mitigating the 
likelihood of systemic banking crisis.  In a cross sectional study of banking systems 
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likely in countries with regulatory regimes that require extensive bank disclosure and 
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  I.  Introduction 
Although banking crises
1 have been a common feature of banking systems for a long time 
– the U.S. alone experienced eleven banking panics between 1800 and the beginning of World 
War I (Baim and Calomiris (2001)) – the crises of recent times have been rather severe.  The cost 
of bailing out troubled banks in a banking crisis ranges between 20 and 50 percent of a country’s 
GDP, with a resolution time that can extend up to nine years (Honohan and Klingebial (2000))
2.  
Hoggarth and Saport (2001) report the average fiscal costs of banking crisis resolution to be 
about 16% of GDP, and the cumulative real output losses from a banking crisis to be more than 
17% of GDP.  As an example, the cost to Indonesia of resolving the crisis of 1997 is estimated at 
50% of its GDP.  Banking problems are also believed to be at the center of the recent financial 
upheaval that engulfed emerging and transition economies (Caprio and Klingebial (1996)).  
These financial crises of the late 1990s coupled with recent corporate scandals around the 
world have brought to the fore the public debate on the need to strengthen market discipline 
through greater disclosure and transparency.  Enhanced transparency via greater disclosure of 
accurate and timely information about banks is believed to improve market discipline, which 
could reduce the likelihood of banking crisis.  This paper investigates empirically the impact of 
greater disclosure on banking system stability. 
                                                 
1Banking crisis, in this study, refers to systemic banking crisis.  Banking instability is the existence of adverse impact from 
dysfunctions in the banking system or the risk thereof (Canoy et al. (2001), and encompasses both individual bank instability 
(bank failure), and banking crisis.  The former refers to a failure of a financial institution, and the latter describes the situation 
where an individual financial institution failure leads to many simultaneous failures of other financial institutions. This is 
different from ‘contagion’ where an individual failure leads to ‘one or more sequential failures’.  Banking crisis could be 
‘systemic’ or borderline.  ‘Systemic’ banking crises are episodes of crises where most or all bank capital in the system is 
exhausted (Caprio and Klingebial (1996).  The detailed criteria used for classifying are provided in section II below. 
2 By contrast, the U.S. banking crisis of the Great Depression of the 1930s, when almost a quarter of the banks were bankrupted, 
the negative net worth of the failed banks was only 3 percent of GDP (Beim and Calomiris (2001)). Other countries had similar 
histories of both infrequent banking crises and low cost of banking collapse. In the pre World-War I era, the countries that 
experienced major banking crisis include Argentina (in 1890), Australia (1893), Brazil (1892), Italy (1893) and Norway (1901), 
but the negative net worth of their failed banks never exceeded 1 percent of GDP, nor the costs of cleaning up exceeded 10 
percent of GDP.  In fact, countries such as Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and Sweden avoided banking crisis 
completely during that era (Beim and Calomiris (2001)). 
  1The role of disclosure to banking system stability is not well understood.  Economic 
theory provides conflicting predictions about the benefits of greater disclosure.  The ‘Disclosure-
Stability’ view holds that greater disclosure and the consequent transparency facilitates efficient 
allocation of resources by improving market discipline. Increased transparency permits greater 
market discipline whereby strong banks are rewarded for their risk management and performance 
and weak banks are penalized with higher costs of raising capital, thereby enabling early 
detection of weak banks before they drag the entire banking system into crisis.  That is, market 
discipline provides incentives for banks to manage their risks prudently and operate efficiently, 
thus reducing the severity and frequency of bank failures.   
On the other hand, the ‘Disclosure-Fragility’ view holds that disclosure may lead to 
interpretation of specific information about banks’ financial conditions unjustifiably as indicator 
of widespread problems in the banking system, thereby leading to bank runs or stock market 
collapse (Calomiris and Mason (1997), Gilbert and Vaughan (1998) and Kaufman (1994)).  
Disclosure of financial problems at a bank may lead to the bank’s failure through a bank run.  It 
may also lead to an overreaction in the financial markets, jeopardizing the ability of the bank to 
raise capital.  This lack of investor confidence could spread to the entire banking system, causing 
systemic banking failure.   In that case, rather than providing market discipline to improve 
resource allocation, more disclosure may lead to the collapse of the banking system, causing 
failure of both strong and weak banks alike. On the other hand, others argue that disclosure of 
bank problems, in fact, leads to quick recovery from crisis, thus reducing realized loss (see, e.g., 
Rosengren (1998)). It would force banking consolidation, transfer of problem assets and closure 
of insolvent banks, speeding the recovery of the banking sector.  
  2The theoretical ambiguities surrounding the impacts of greater disclosure to bank stability 
are reflected in the public policy debate and the reluctance of countries in adopting pro-
disclosure policies.  International organizations such as the Basle Committee, the World Bank, 
and the International Monetary Fund recommend countries to enhance the transparency of their 
banking sectors by improving disclosure. Yet, despite these calls, disclosure and transparency is 
not always the hallmark of banking sector reform policies in all countries.  Japan, for example, 
adopted a policy of less disclosure recently while undergoing a protracted period of banking 
crisis.  Since 1998, banks in Japan are required to report securities at book rather than at market 
value (understating liabilities), to provide own estimates of market value of real estate holdings, 
and to net loans against deposits to same customers (underreporting risk) (Jordan et al. (1999)).     
The study of bank disclosure and bank performance is especially important in light of the 
ongoing public policy initiatives that rely on disclosure as a centerpiece of regulatory reforms in 
the banking sector.  The Basel committee has finalized a new framework for bank capital 
adequacy.  The New Basel Capital Accord relies on minimum capital requirement (pillar 1) and 
supervisory review of bank assessment of capital relative to risk (pillar 2), complemented by 
market discipline via greater disclosure requirements (pillar 3) (see BCBS (2003)).   By 
providing flexibility for banks in measuring their risk and capital adequacy, the New Accord 
brought market discipline into focus as a supplemental tool in bank capital regulation.   
Despite its importance in banking sector policy and the surrounding theoretical 
ambiguity, there is little cross-country empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in bank 
system stability.  For the U.S., Jordan et al. (1999) examine the impact of disclosing supervisory 
information on troubled U.S. banks during financial crisis, and report that doing so does not lead 
to destabilization of the banking system. Baumann and Nier (2003) examine the relation between 
  3disclosure and bank capital and risk, and report an inverse relation between disclosure and bank 
risk-taking.  They do not study banking crises at a national level however.  There is a growing 
empirical literature on banking crises; yet the literature does not address the role of disclosure 
regulations. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Beck et al. (2003) investigate 
respectively the role of macroeconomic stability and banking regulation in banking crisis. Cull, 
Senbet and Sorge (2005) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) examine the relations 
between deposit insurance design features and banking crises.  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) 
explore the relation between bank regulation and banking crisis, but they do not address the issue 
of disclosure directly. In the context of the effectiveness of banking regulation, they examine the 
degree of private monitoring on bank performance and fragility.  They find that while private 
monitoring increases bank performance, it has no association with bank fragility, and pose the 
issue as a puzzle. This study focuses exclusively on financial disclosure and audit stringency as 
part of private monitoring, and finds that this has indeed a robust positive role in fostering 
banking system stability. Delving into specific regulatory features, the paper also provides an 
assessment of the importance of individual disclosure and auditing regulatory provisions in 
promoting stability.  In a companion paper, Tadesse (2005) explores the role of overall 
transparency that includes both the quality of disclosure and the degree of information gathering 
activity by investors as well as the extent of information dissemination in the country. 
 The paper studies the impact of increased bank disclosure requirements and stronger 
auditing regulatory regime on the likelihood of occurrence of a systemic banking crisis based on 
data on forty nine countries over the period 1990 through 1997.  It examines the impacts of both 
overall improvements in disclosure and the disclosure of specific items of information relevant to 
the ability of outside investors to assess bank risk and capital adequacy. Similarly, the study 
  4examines the impacts of improvements in overall external auditing stringency, and of the specific 
regulatory requirements that improve audit effectiveness.  To draw accurate inferences about the 
impact of disclosure and audit stringency on bank crisis, it controls for a number of factors that 
may influence banking fragility.  Following the literature, it controls for differences in the macro 
economic environments of banking system, the overall institutional quality of countries, and for 
differences in bank market structure, such as the degree of competition, concentration, ownership 
structure, capital regulations, entry regulations, and restrictions on bank activity. 
The study finds that the likelihood of systemic banking crisis is, in general, lower in 
countries with regulations that require higher standards of disclosure. It finds that the likelihood 
of banking crisis is lower in countries whose banks provide more comprehensive information 
both in the core standard financial statements and in the supplemental notes.  In reference to 
specific disclosure regulations, banking crisis is less likely in countries that require disclosure of 
off-balance sheet transactions.  The likelihood of banking crisis is also lower in countries that 
require a more accurate presentation of financial information in general and an accurate 
presentation of non-performing loans (NPLs) in particular. Consolidated financial reporting is 
considered to be more accurate (or informative) presentation, and the study finds that regulations 
that require consolidated financial reporting for related bank activities are associated with greater 
likelihood of banking system stability.  
The impact of greater banking disclosure to banking stability appears to be economically 
significant.  An increase in bank disclosure by one standard deviation reduces the likelihood of 
banking crisis by about 3.5% per annum.  In cost terms, applying this probability to the 
cumulative output loss of a typical banking crisis episode, the benefit translates to a saving of 
  5about ½ a percent of GDP.  These results appear not to be driven by reverse causality and are 
robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. 
The study finds that the likelihood of systemic banking crisis is also lower in countries 
that require more stringent external auditing of bank financial reporting.  In particular, banking 
crisis is lower in countries where external auditing is made a strong tool of bank supervision by 
requiring auditors to report to the supervisory agency, and where permitting auditors to meet 
supervisory agency without the consent of the auditee enhances auditor independence.  The study 
also finds that audit stringency is complementary to bank disclosure in that the contribution of 
audit stringency to banking system stability is in addition to the benefit of bank disclosure.   
Overall, the findings are consistent with the ‘disclosure-stability’ view.   While 
improvements in disclosure in many dimensions are found to be either associated with greater 
bank stability or to have no significant relation to stability, there is no evidence that greater 
disclosure is related to banking system fragility.  In terms of current public policy, the results 
provide an empirical support for the New Accord’s initiative in requiring greater disclosure as a 
source of banking system stability.  Going forward, however, to enhance the benefits of greater 
disclosure, the results emphasize the importance of improving the credibility of financial 
reporting as well.  While expanding the scope of bank disclosure, the New Accord fails to 
provide verification requirements beyond those required for financial reporting, and security 
registration.  The results underscore the value of external auditing stringency in improving 
transparency and promoting bank stability.  
The balance of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a detailed 
description of the data and the methodology. Section III presents the main results and Section IV 
provides additional robustness tests.  Section V provides discussion and concluding remarks. 
  6II.  Data and Methodology 
  A. Data 
 
  The study attempts to explain the likelihood of incidence of banking crisis as a function 
of banking regulations that govern bank disclosure and auditing. To this end, I rely on data from 
two major sources.  Information on incidences of banking crises is obtained from the database of 
Caprio and Klingebial (2003), which provides comprehensive information on episodes of 
banking crisis since the 1970s for a large sample of countries.  The data on regulation of 
disclosure and auditing is from a new World Bank database, explained in Barth et al. (2004), and 
is based on surveys of bank supervisory bodies in the late 1990s.  Though, Barth et al. (2004) 
reports that the regulatory and supervisory environment, in general, does not change significantly 
over time, it is reasonable to assume that the survey responses reflect the period closest to when 
the survey was taken (i.e., the 1990s) more accurately than the distant past. For this reason, 
although the data on banking crises extends to the 1970’s, I focus rather on explaining incidence 
of banking crisis only in the 90s (1990 through 1997).  For this period, I cover all countries with 
data on bank regulation and supervision and data on crises as my sample.  This results in a 
sample size of 49 countries with 21 episodes of crises involving 20 countries. (Appendix I 
presents the list of countries in the sample and the episodes of crisis in the 1990s.) Below, I 
explain these data sources and the specific variables in greater detail. 
  Banking Crises:  Caprio and Klingebial (2003) provide data on the occurrences and 
severity of banking crises for a large sample of countries.  Crises are classified as either major 
(or systemic) or mild (non-systemic). Systemic crises are defined to be episodes in which most or 
all bank capital in the banking system is exhausted.  Consistent with criteria also used in other 
works (Caprio and Klingebial (2003), Barth et al. (2004), and Demirguc-Kunt (1998)), episodes 
  7are considered systemic if (i) non-performing assets account for more than 10% of total assets or 
(ii) rescue costs amount to more than 2% of GDP or (iii) the crisis involved large scale 
nationalizations or (iv) the crisis involved bank runs where emergency measures are taken.   
I construct a variable, Crisis, as an indicator variable that takes 1 if a country has undergone 
systemic banking crisis in the period 1990 through 1997.   As discussed above, the focus on the 
1990s is because of the availability of data on disclosure and audit stringency only for this period 
(to be discussed below under sample selection).   
  I use two sets of explanatory variables, in addition to the set of control variables, to 
explain incidence of systemic banking crises (Crisis).  These are variables on (1) the regulation 
of disclosure practices, and (2) the regulation of bank auditing.  
Regulation of Disclosure Practices:  Bank disclosure is mandated in all countries, and 
the respective supervisory body sanctions the minimum set of disclosure requirements.  Data on 
disclosure requirements is obtained from a recent database on bank supervision and regulation 
maintained by the World Bank (see, Barth, et al. (2001). The database is constructed based on 
surveys of national bank regulatory and supervisory authorities in 1998 and 1999.  I utilize the 
survey responses on issues of disclosure and auditing to construct indices of bank disclosure, 
disclosure informativeness and external audit stringency. The World Bank survey questions on 
disclosure and auditing regulations are provided in Appendix III.   
Bank Disclosure: The focal variable of interest, Bank Disclosure, measures the extent 
and comprehensiveness of financial reporting as required by the banking regulation in the 
country. From the World bank survey questions about disclosure regulations, I construct this 
measure based on the responses to the following questions in the World Bank survey: (i) whether 
bank financial reports in the country should include information on bank risk management 
  8practices,  (ii) whether bank disclosure regulations require accurate representation of non-
performing loans (NPLs), by requiring accrued income on non-performing loans (NPL) to not be 
reported in the bank’s income statement, (iii) whether bank reporting rules promote presentation 
of comprehensive information by requiring consolidation of financial information between bank 
and non-bank subsidiaries, and (iv) if bank-reporting regulations encourage full disclosure by 
requiring that off-balance sheet transactions be disclosed to the public. The responses are coded 
as values of 1 and 0, and the variable Bank Disclosure is constructed as a principal component 
of the four indicator values.  Higher values indicate more comprehensive disclosure as required 
by bank regulation.  This definition of sound disclosure is also consistent with the literature.  
Rosengren (1998), for example, considers adequate public disclosure of risk management 
practices and accurate representation of NPLs as attributes of sound disclosure. 
Supplemental Reporting:  measures the extent of supplementary information (vis-a-vis 
what is reported in the core financial statements) as required by countries’ regulation.  Out of the 
variables that constitute Bank Disclosure, I construct a new variable that summarizes the extent 
of supplemental information by aggregating the requirement that banks provide information on 
risk management practices and the requirements for reporting of off-balance sheet transactions to 
the public.  Supplemental Reporting is a principal component of Risk and Off-Balance Sheet. 
In addition to these specific disclosure related variables, I also consider a variable to 
measure the degree of legal sanctions against bank officials for nonconformance to these 
regulations.  The new variable, Director Liability, aggregates (i) an indicator variable that takes 
the value 1 if directors in that country are legally liable for misleading information, and (ii) a 
variable that takes 1 if those legal sanctions have actually been enforced against directors in 
recent years.   
  9Table 1 and 2 provide a summary of these variables.  The disclosure variables exhibit 
wide variation across countries. Bank disclosure is negatively correlated with incidence of 
banking crisis (though the relation is not statistically significant). The same is true of the relation 
between crisis and supplemental information.   
Regulation of Audit Practices:  The role of external auditors is critically important in 
bank disclosure.  The benefit of disclosure is that it enables investors (market participants) to 
make accurate assessment of the firm’s financial condition.  In their loan decisions, banks collect 
private information from their customers.  However, banks are reluctant to disclose proprietary 
information about their customers, making it difficult for outsiders, without access to individual 
loan information, to assess the health of the bank. This is more so in banks that lend to small 
firms which do not publicly disclose their information. Bank examiners and auditors have access 
to bank’s individual loans and the banks’ risk management practices.  Hence they play an 
important role in validating the financial information disclosed by the banks.   
Bank supervisory authorities regulate audit practices. Data on audit practices is obtained 
from the World Bank database on bank supervision and regulation (Barth et al. (2004)). I use 
survey responses on seven different audit practice measures to construct an aggregate index of 
external auditing stringency. 
External Audit Stringency, the focal variable of interest, measures the degree to which 
external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected by the regulations that 
govern bank-auditing practices.  From the World bank survey questions about audit-practice 
regulations, I construct the variable based on the responses to the following questions: (i) 
whether external audit of banks is a compulsory requirement, (ii) whether the scope of external 
audit is mandated by the regulation, (iii) whether there is a license requirement for auditors, (iv) 
  10whether it is a requirement that auditors’ reports should be reported to supervisory authorities, 
and (v) whether supervisors can meet external auditors to discuss audit report without the banks’ 
approval.  The response to each of these questions was coded as 1 or 0.  Affirmative response to 
any of the questions is indicative of greater stringency of a audit regulatory regime, and 
therefore, coded as 1.  The External-Audit Stringency variable is constructed as a principal 
component of the five indicator variables. Independent, professional and rigorous third-party 
audit provides validation that bank-produced statements represent the financial condition of the 
bank as is, thereby increasing the credibility of the bank disclosure.  To the extent that this 
enhances the ability of market participants to accurately assess the risk profile and capital 
adequacy of the bank, and strengthens market discipline, increases in External-Audit 
Stringency as well as each of the component variables would be associated with lower rates of 
fragility. 
In addition to these specific audit quality-related variables, I also consider the legal 
sanctions against auditors in the case of nonconformance.  Auditor Liability measures the degree 
of legal sanctions against auditors in the case of nonconformance.  I construct a variable by 
aggregating three variables that reflect legal burdens against auditors: (i) an indicator variable 
that takes 1 if auditors are legally required to report misconduct by managers/directors to 
supervisory agency, (ii) a variable that assumes the value 1 if legal action against external 
auditors be taken by supervisor for negligence, and (iii) a variable on legal enforcement which 
takes 1 if legal action has been taken against auditor in recent years. 
Table 1 and 2 provide summary of the variables. The stringency of external audit varies 
extensively across countries. Table 1 shows that the External Audit Stringency variable exhibits 
wide variation ranging in value from –6.725 to 0.554. Countries high on audit stringency tend to 
  11have lower incidence of banking crisis (Table 2). Audit stringency and crisis exhibit significant 
negative correlation.  Other indicators of audit professionalism, independence and audit rigor are 
all inversely correlated with incidence of crisis (not reported).   
Control Variables: To examine the relations between disclosure, audit stringency and 
banking crises, I control for a number of factors.  Following the literature on crises (e.g., Barth et 
al. (2004), Cull et al. (2005)), I use the average rate of inflation and the external terms of trade 
to control for sources of macroeconomic (in) stability that are likely to affect the quality of bank 
assets.  Inflation serves as a proxy for macroeconomic mismanagement that adversely affects the 
economy and the banking system. A chronically inflationary environment deteriorates the quality 
of bank assets, with the likely effect of increasing banking crisis probability.  External terms of 
trade captures the macro economic shocks that could adversely affect banks by increasing their 
non-performing loans.  Improvements in terms of trade are expected to be associated with 
decreases in the likelihood of bank crises. In addition, I include Per capita GDP to control for 
the level of development of the country, and as a proxy for the quality of overall institutional 
environment. Banking sector problems could result from weaknesses in the legal system, which 
permeates widespread fraud, and/or weaknesses in the administrative capacity that is reflected in 
loose prudential supervision and regulation of the banking system. Per capita GDP is expected to 
measure differences across countries on these dimensions. 
To check for robustness, we also consider other macro-economic variables as controls.  
These include real interest rate, foreign exchange reserve and GDP growth, and will be discussed 
under robustness section below. 
In addition, I include measures of banking industry structure since recent research 
identifies industry structure as having measurable effects on the likelihood of banking crises.  
  12Beck et al. (2003), for example, report that banking crisis is lower in countries with concentrated 
banking system, and both Beck et al. (2003) and Barth et al. (2004) find that countries with 
banking industry structure that allows more competition and less regulatory restrictions have 
lower incidence of bank crises.  I use bank concentration, the share of assets of the three largest 
banks, to control for banking system concentration, and expect to find that concentrated banking 
would be associated with less likelihood of crisis – a negative coefficient.   
As an alternative measure of the banking industry structure, I use a variable, bank 
competition, which is a measure of banking competitive conduct obtained from Claessens and 
Laeven (2004).  Using a methodology from Panzar and Rosse (1987), they develop an index of 
competitiveness based on bank-level data in a large cross-section of banking systems, as a sum 
of the elasticity of bank revenue to changes in input prices.  The variable, bank competition, 
takes values between 1 (perfect competition) and 0 (with less than 1 representing monopolistic 
competition). Claessens and Laeven (2004) find that banking systems with less entry restrictions, 
less restriction to foreign bank entry and activity restrictions are more competitive, but find no 
inverse relation between competitiveness (measured in this way) and bank concentration.  Barth 
et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2003) report inverse relation between restrictive regulations against 
entry and activity, and banking crisis.  I expect greater bank competition in the banking system 
to be associated with lower likelihood of banking crisis.   
Additional controls about the institutional environment of banking are also considered as 
robustness.  These include banking regulation on entry requirements to the industry, measures of 
regulatory restrictions on banking activity, index of banking freedom, and state ownership of 
banks. These variables will be discussed under robustness section below. 
  13Table 1 summarizes the variables. The data displays enormous variations in the 
macroeconomic conditions and banking industry structure.  Average inflation (log) ranges from 
0.01 to 0.46 and, consistent with priors, is positively correlated with incidence of crisis. Bank 
concentration varies from a low of 19 percent to a high of 100 percent and, consistent with 
expectations, is associated with bank system stability, as is bank competition which has a 
significant negative correlation with incidence of crisis (Table 2).  As would be expected, Per 
capita GDP is negatively correlated with incidence of banking crisis. 
B. Methodology 
  I adopt a multivariate logit model of the following form to examine the relation between 
disclosure and banking fragility, estimating the likelihood of banking-crisis occurrence in a 
country as a function of a set of explanatory variables of interest, X that represents disclosure 
and auditing regulatory requirements, and a set of control variables, Z.   
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β and λ are vectors of parameters of interest to be estimated, and Crisisit is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if country i is in a systemic banking crisis in year t, and 0 otherwise.  Such a specification 
conforms earlier studies of banking crises (see, e.g., Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998, 2002)).   
In the main regressions, I define each year for a country as either a crisis year or a non-
crisis year, and examine the relation between crisis probability in an average year and country 
disclosure and auditing variables. Each country is included eight times (1990 through 1997) in a 
pooled time-series cross section. A concern in this type of specification is that it may introduce a 
problem of correlated errors (or lack of independence) because crisis episodes may be correlated 
across years for a country and/or across countries resulting in contagion.  I address these 
methodological issues in the robustness section in a number of ways, including redefining the 
  14crisis event as a single event for a country, specifying the model as a panel with random effects, 
and estimating it as a cross-country regression. 
Another concern is the fact that the disclosure and auditing variables are measured in the 
late 1990s while the crisis episodes are observed over the 1990 through 1997.  This is dictated by 
problem of data limitation.  The first survey of bank regulation on which the disclosure indices 
are based was conducted in 1997 and the data is not simply available before then.  The problem, 
however, may raise a concern that the disclosure and auditing data would reflect the banks’ 
responses to crises episodes rather than the other way round, hence introducing reverse causality. 
That is to mean that a country may improve its disclosure environment in response to crises.  
One can, however, effectively address such a reverse causality issue through instrumental 
variables approach. In the robustness section below, I examine the relation between the 
exogenous component of bank disclosure and auditing – i.e., that part explainable by exogenous 
instruments (such as differences in legal origin of countries) – and crisis probability, the 
dependent variable. In addition, if it were true that a country improves its disclosure after a crisis 
episode, one would expect, on average, an occurrence of banking crisis to be followed by 
improvements in disclosure practices – i.e., a positive relation between crisis probability and 
disclosure. The effect of this data problem would, therefore, be to bias the results in favor of the 
‘Disclosure-Fragility’ hypothesis, and against the ‘Disclosure-Stability’ thesis. Hence, in the case 
of a finding of positive relation between crisis probability and disclosure, caution should be 
exercised in interpreting the results. However, once causality is accounted for, a finding of 
negative relation would be a strong evidence for the ‘Disclosure-Stability’ view, given the 
presumed ‘bias’ in the data. 
  15With these qualifications, I use the cross-country variation in the disclosure variables as 
observed in 1997 as a proxy for variations in the disclosure climate during the sample period. 
That is, it is assumed that, while there is cross-country variation, the relative rankings of the 
countries in their level of disclosure remains stable over this short period of time. Barth et al. 
(2004), for example, reports that the regulatory and supervisory environment of which bank 
disclosure is a consequence does not change significantly over time. The sample provides 
evidence consistent with this assumption. Despite the fact that the crises countries presumably 
may have improved their disclosure practices, as a group, these countries score significantly 
lower than the non-crises countries in all measures of bank disclosure and audit stringency. The 
average value of bank disclosure and audit stringency for crises countries are -0.245and –0.243 
respectively while that for non-crisis countries are 0.296 and 0.244 respectively, and the 
differences are statistically significant at one-percent level. 
III. Results 
  A.  Disclosure Requirements and Banking Crises 
  Table 3 presents the results on the empirical relation between disclosure requirements and 
banking system stability. The table indicates that greater disclosure requirements reduce the 
likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis.  The disclosure variable enters the empirical 
models with a large statistically significant negative sign.  The inverse relation between greater 
disclosure and banking fragility holds controlling for macroeconomic sources of instability as 
well as banking industry structure.  In column (1) disclosure is associated with lower likelihood 
of systemic banking crisis controlling for macro-economic sources of bank instability.  Column 
(2) indicates that disclosure lowers the likelihood of banking crisis, controlling for banking 
industry structure.  The results hold in column (3) where I account for both sets of controls. 
  16Crisis probability is lower as well after controlling for the level of countries development as a 
proxy for overall institutional quality (column (4)). 
The results are consistent with the thesis that greater disclosure enhances bank system 
stability via strengthening market discipline. The impact of greater disclosure to bank stability is 
economically large.  For example, based on the complete model estimates in column (4), 
increasing disclosure by one standard deviation would lower the likelihood of banking crisis by 
about 3.5 percent
3. This is a significant reduction, given that crisis probabilities are very low at 
any point in time (the mean value is about 6%).  Hoggarth and Saport (2001) report the 
cumulative output loss of the average banking crisis to be about 16 percent of GDP.  Applying 
the crisis-ameliorating probabilities, the impact of greater disclosure would be a saving of 
roughly about ½ percent of GDP. 
With respect to the control variables, confirming economic theory and previous empirical 
results, improvements in external terms of trade reduces crisis probability while unbridled 
inflation increases crisis probability. More developed economies are less likely to suffer systemic 
banking crisis, indicating the positive role of the overall quality of the institutional environment.  
As predicted, bank concentration lowers banking crisis probability, confirming the results in 
Beck et al. (2003).  Also, as expected, banking crisis is less likely in more competitive banking 
systems. While this is broadly consistent with earlier findings (Barth et al. (2004)) and Beck et 
al. (2003)) that regulatory restrictions as to entry and bank activity foster bank fragility, the 
direct evidence that increased competitive conduct (or competitiveness) lowers the likelihood of 
banking crisis is a new finding in this paper.  The seemingly contradictory findings that both 
                                                 
3 Noting that the predicted value from the model provides an estimate for Ln(pit/(1+pit), increasing Disclosure by one 
standard deviation (i.e. 0.945), holding the other variables at their mean levels, increases Ln(pit/(1+pit) by -3.325 (i.e. 
-3.519X 0.945).  Solving for pit, probability that banking crisis would occur in country i during period t, pit = e
-
3.325/(1+e
-3.325), which is equal to 0.0347. 
  17concentrated and competitive markets foster stability could be interpreted as that it is the 
contestability of markets that matter.  Alternatively, large banks through their diversification 
ability strengthen banking system stability while increased competition curbs the banks’ 
potential extractive tendencies. Overall, the model fits the data well, correctly providing an in-
sample prediction of crises episodes more than ninety percent of the time. But note that this high 
level of fit is to the in-sample observations based on which the models are estimated, and in no 
way speaks of predictability of crisis out-of-the-sample. 
Panel B of Table 3 explores the disclosure-stability link by focusing on the role of 
specific disclosure properties.  Supplementary information, in addition to the standard financial 
statements, appears to significantly impact the effectiveness of bank disclosure to stability.  Such 
information, in the form of a detailed discussion of bank risk management practices and off-
balance sheet transactions allow informed assessment of bank risk profile by market participants, 
fostering market disciple to work. Column (5) indicates the impact of this type of information in 
enhancing banking stability. 
In general, specific requirements meant to increase greater accuracy and 
comprehensiveness of disclosure are associated with higher probability of bank stability.  In 
particular, regulatory requirements that call for consolidated financial statements for banks 
(Column 7), and requirements for disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions (Column 8) to the 
public lower the likelihood of bank crises. Requirements for accurate reporting of non-
performing loans (Column 6) enters with a negative sign (implying that it reduces bank fragility), 
but are significant only at 20% level.  Similarly, disclosure of risk management methods 
(Column 9), while enters with the right sign, is not significant at the conventional levels.  
  18Regulations that sanction legal liability on directors for misinformation have no 
statistically significant impact on fragility (column 10).  This may reflect the fact that those 
sanctions could be covered in the countries’ security laws, and hence could be redundant when 
packaged as bank regulation.  To see if the impacts of disclosure requirements on banking 
stability are simply reflections of the legal sanctions against managers for misinformation, in 
column (11), I include both the disclosure and the directors’ liability variables.  Greater 
disclosure fosters banking system stability after accounting for legal liability.  
Overall, the results are consistent with the disclosure-stability view that greater disclosure 
fosters bank stability via market discipline.  The results are also supportive of the goal of the 
third pillar of the New Basal Capital Accord that aims to encourage market discipline by 
developing a set of disclosure requirements that allow market participants to assess bank risk 
positions and capital adequacy.  The benefits of the specific recommendations in areas of 
supplemental reporting, consolidation, and reporting risk methodologies for fostering bank 
stability are validated by the findings. 
B.  Regulation of Audit Practices and Banking Crises 
 
Table 4 indicates that regulations that call for stringent external audit of bank-generated 
information lowers the likelihood of banking crises.  External Audit Stringency enters the 
regressions with a large statistically significant negative coefficient in all specifications. In 
column (1), greater audit stringency is associated with lower likelihood of systemic banking 
crisis, controlling for macro-economic sources of bank instability.  Column (2) indicates that 
banking systems with stringent external audit requirements are less vulnerable to crisis, 
controlling for banking industry structure.  The inverse relation between audit stringency and 
  19bank fragility holds in column (3) where I account for both sets of controls.  The same holds, 
when, in addition, I control for countries’ level of development.  
Evaluating the marginal effects of audit stringency, we see that a one standard deviation 
increase in the audit variable based on the full model in column (4) results in a decrease in crisis 
probability by about 25 percent, a much larger effect than the impact of disclosure.  However, 
one should note that a comparison of the two could be misleading as the audit stringency variable 
has a much wider distribution than the disclosure variable. Nonetheless, the computation 
provides a sense of how large the economic impact of strengthening audit requirements is. 
To evaluate if this effect of audit stringency on bank crisis is simply a proxy for the 
impact of greater disclosure, column (5) explicitly controls for bank disclosure. More stringent 
external audit requirements foster bank stability, controlling for greater disclosure.  The result 
indicates that stringent auditing is not a substitute for accurate and comprehensive disclosure. 
Rather regulations that call for more vigilant external audit complement greater disclosure in 
fostering banking system stability. 
The results also indicate that the control variables act as predicted. The overall effects of 
bank concentration and bank competition on crisis likelihood are still negative and significant. 
Terms of trade improvements reduce and higher inflation increases crisis probability.  In 
addition, the models fit the data well, correctly providing an in-sample correct identification of 
episodes of crises up to ninety percent of the time. 
Panel B of Table 4 examines the link between auditing stringency and bank system 
stability further by focusing on specific external auditing-related regulatory requirements.  In 
general, specific requirements meant to increase external audit stringency are associated with 
lower likelihood of banking crises.  Measures meant to represent strengthening of auditor 
  20independence appear to be most important (columns (7) and (8).  These are the requirements for 
external audit reports to be submitted to supervisory authorities, and the requirement that bank 
supervisory authorities can meet external auditors to discuss audit reports without bank approval.   
Regulations that set standards about the amount and extent of audit (column (6)) is not 
statistically related to bank stability (though the variable carries the right sign).  I do not report 
on the impacts of having compulsory auditing and the requirements for auditors to be licensed 
because, in the sample, almost all countries (except Italy) require audited financial statements 
and licensed or certified auditors. The variables do not exhibit cross-country variation.  
Regulations that sanction additional legal liability against auditors and enforcement of 
those sanctions do not appear to materially affect bank stability.  Again, it might be that those 
sanctions are covered in the countries’ security laws and could be redundant in banking 
regulations. To see if the impact of external audit stringency to banking stability is merely a 
reflection of the legal sanctions against auditors, column (10) includes both auditor liability and 
audit stringency.  External audit stringency robustly reduces crisis probability controlling for 
auditor liability. 
The findings support the disclosure-stability view in that stringent external audit 
complements greater disclosure in fostering bank stability. The results are consistent with the 
notion that external audit add value to market discipline by providing third-party verification of 
information that banks are reluctant to release to the public voluntarily.  In their loan decisions, 
banks collect private information from their customers.  Banks are reluctant to disclose 
proprietary information about their customers, making it difficult for outsiders, without access to 
individual loan information, to assess the health of the bank. External auditors have access to 
bank’s individual loans and the banks’ risk management practices.  By validating through their 
  21audit report, external auditors enrich the information environment, allowing investors to assess 
bank health, and market discipline to work in fostering bank stability.   
In this respect, the New Basal Capital Accord, while requiring extensive disclosure, does 
not recommend external audit beyond required for financial reporting purposes.  The evidence 
suggests that there may be value in extending audit requirements to cover the newly required 
disclosure.  
IV. Robustness  Checks 
 
To ensure accurate inference and avoid mechanical explanations for the main results so 
far, I provide a series of sensitivity checks in this section.  First, in Table 5, I examine the 
sensitivity of the results to inclusion of variables omitted in the main regressions.  I consider both 
macro-economic (Panel A) and institutional variables (Panel B). The regression results in all 
models include all explanatory and control variables in the basic regression (i.e., Bank 
Concentration, Bank Competition, Inflation, Terms of Trade, and per capita GDP).  To conserve 
space, I report the coefficients of the new variables and the focal variables of interest – that is, of 
the disclosure and audit variables only. 
Economic theory predicts that macro economic shocks that adversely affect the economic 
performance of bank borrowers, whose impacts cannot be diversified away by the banks, would 
be positively related to bank fragility and incidences of crises.  Among these economic shocks, I 
include in the main regressions shocks to external terms of trade and inflation. Another variable 
that may capture adverse macro economic shocks that hurt banks via increasing non-performing 
loans may be the general output downturns related to the business cycle.  In column (1) of Table 
5, I include a measure of the business cycle, the growth rate in real GDP, in the main regression.  
  22The main results that disclosure and audit stringency reduce crisis probability are robust.  
Growth in the GDP does not enter significantly. 
Bank profitability is partly a function of the costs of funds the bank pays on its deposits. 
High interest rate could increase the cost of funds for the bank. In addition, high interest rates 
could increase the default rate of bank borrowers, thus reducing the value of bank assets. To 
control for the banks cost of funds, I include the short-term real interest rate in the country in 
columns (2), in addition to the control variables of the main regressions.  The main results of the 
paper that bank disclosure and auditing reduces crisis probability remain robust. Real interest 
rate, while carrying the correct sign in the regressions, does not enter with statistical significance. 
The probability of systemic banking crisis can also be affected by the vulnerability of the 
banking system to sudden capital outflows from the country.  In countries particularly with fixed 
exchange rate regimes, a general lack of confidence by foreign investors, or a mismatch of 
foreign and local rates of return on investments, may lead to sudden outflows of foreign capital, 
which could lead to illiquidity at the central bank and banking crisis, when investors convert 
their local deposits into foreign currency. To control for the potential effects of sudden capital 
outflows, I include as a variable the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves in column (3).  The 
variable captures the extent to which the liabilities of the banking system are backed by 
international reserves. During currency crisis, investors may rush to convert their domestic 
deposits into foreign currency so that the ratio measures the ability of the central bank to meet 
these demands. Calvo (1996) considers this ratio as a good predictor of a country’s vulnerability 
to balance of payments crises. The main results of the paper are robust to accounting for this 
variable. Consistent with the theory, external vulnerability as measured by M2 to reserve ratio 
significantly increases crisis probability. In column (4), the main results hold when all the three 
  23new variables (GDP growth, real interest rate and M2/reserve ratio) are included together in the 
regression. 
In addition to macro-economic factors, the main regressions control for the institutional 
and regulatory environments of the banking sector.  As additional robustness, Panel B checks for 
the sensitivity of the main results to other institutional features not controlled for in the 
regressions. I explore the impacts of the overall institutional environment of banks and bank 
ownership on bank fragility. First, I check if using direct measures of banking competition would 
matter. In addition to the bank concentration and competition measures used earlier, column (5) 
includes a measure of restriction to enter the banking industry from Barth et al. (2001).  
Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Beck et al. (2003)), countries with fewer hurdles to entry 
to the banking sector are less likely to experience banking crisis.  The main result that disclosure 
reduces crisis probability is robust. Column (6) uses a measure of regulatory restrictions on bank 
activity. The index measures the relative ease with which banks can engage in various economic 
activities including securities, real estate and insurance markets. Column (7) uses instead an 
index of bank freedom. The main result remains robust.  Columns (8) through (10) consider a 
measure of state ownership in banking, in combination with measures of entry and activity 
restrictions.  Again, the main results are robust to controlling for the ownership structure in the 
banking system. Consistent with expectations and previous research (e.g., Beck et al. (2003), 
extensive government ownership in the banking sector is associated with bank fragility.   
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2002) report that explicit deposit insurance increases (weakly) banking 
instability via exasperating the risk-shifting incentives of banks. Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), 
on the other hand, report a positive effect of explicit insurance to banking stability. To account 
for the incentive effects of deposit insurance features, I include an indicator variable for explicit 
  24deposit insurance countries, similar to the way Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2002) did. The results, 
under column (11) are robust; regulated disclosure and audit stringency reduce crisis probability, 
controlling for the design feature of the banking safety
4. 
In addition to the selection of control variables, the research design and the specification 
of the empirical methodology may influence the reported results. In Table 6, I explore the 
sensitivity of the results to changes in the research design and methodology. To begin, the main 
results of the paper, the inverse relation between disclosure and banking system fragility and 
between external audit stringency and fragility is robust to measuring the focal variables – Bank 
Disclosure and External Audit Stringency - differently.  In columns (1) through (3) of Table 6, 
I measure Bank Disclosure and External Audit Stringency as sums of the component indicator 
variables rather than as principal components.  The effect of greater disclosure and audit 
stringency on crisis likelihood is negative and very significant. 
 In the main regression, a crisis event in a country is defined as any year in the sample 
period, 1990 through 1997, in which the country was in crisis. This means that each country is 
included seven times in a pooled time-series cross section, and the year in which the country was 
in crisis was coded as a crisis year. Such a design may raise some concerns.  The first is that it is 
very difficult to ascertain the beginning and the end of a crisis episode, and thus the designation 
of a particular year as a crisis year may not be precise.  Second, to the extent that crisis events in 
contagious years may be correlated, the design may introduce a lack of independence in the error 
terms.   Columns (3) through (6), explore the robustness of the results for alternative 
specifications that address these issues. 
                                                 
4 The maximum likelihood iterations fail to converge under reasonable boundary conditions for the specification 
under column (11). The result is reported for completeness. 
  25In columns (4), I define the crisis event more broadly so that if a country experiences a 
banking crisis in any year between 1990 and 1997, it is considered a crisis country for the entire 
sample period. Hence the twenty countries that went through crises were considered as if they 
experienced crisis in every year of the sample period.  The results show that changing the 
definition of the crisis event in this manner does not affect the main results. The effects of greater 
bank disclosure and audit stringency remain negative and highly significant.   
Columns (5) consider a rather narrow definition of the crisis event in that when the crisis 
period lasts more than a year, I define as the crisis year (event) only the first year of the crisis 
period and exclude the subsequent crisis years from the analysis. Doing so reduces the sample 
size considerably, but alleviates the lack-of-independence problem. It has also an advantage of 
reducing some reverse causality concerns that may arise when a country undergoes multiple 
years of crisis – the macroeconomic environment in the subsequent years during the crisis period 
may be influenced by the onset of the crisis.  Dropping the subsequent years entirely reduces this 
type of reverse causality. The impact of bank disclosure is unaffected by such a change in the 
design
5.  Hence, the main results of the paper, the inverse relation between bank disclosure and 
fragility and between audit stringency and fragility are robust to defining the crisis episodes 
differently.   
Column (6) checks whether the main findings are sensitive to whether a banking system 
has experienced recent crisis.  I include an indicator variable that takes 1 if the country has gone 
through a banking crisis in the 80s. The results hold controlling for recent crisis history.   
In addition to the concerns related to the way the crisis event was defined, it might be 
argued that, because there could be a number of factors that induce banking crisis, the observed 
                                                 
5 I also run a cross-sectional specification where each county enters only once as a crisis or no-crisis country. The 
results do not change, though for reasonable parameters the likelihood function fails to converge in some cases. 
  26result might still be a reflection of omitted explanatory variables that are correlated with the 
disclosure variables. The potential variables are too many to feasibly include, and even if it were 
feasible, the variables would be highly correlated with each other making identification of the 
effects of any one variable difficult.  The main regression attempts to control for the key macro-
economic and institutional variables suggested in economic theory. Table 5 above controls for 
additional variables.  However, to effectively address both the potential omitted variables and the 
problem of lack-of-independence in the error terms, Columns (7) estimates the original model 
using a panel data methodology, specifying the latent country-related and time-related sources of 
variations on the dependent variable, crisis, as random effects.  The random-effects panel 
specification has two advantages: (i) it accounts for intra-country and intra-year correlations in 
the error terms, and (ii) it properly controls for all other non-observable country-related and 
time-related sources of crisis probability.  The model accounts for any omitted country and time 
factor.  The results show that banking disclosure and audit stringency has robust negative 
impacts on banking fragility. 
   Finally, the results from the multivariate logistic regression do not explicitly control for 
the potential for endogeneity.  As explained above, I use banking- disclosure variables drawn 
from the period after when we observe the countries’ crises experiences.  This may raise a 
concern that the disclosure data would reflect the banks’ responses to crises episodes, hence 
introducing reverse causality.  If it is true that a country improves its disclosure after a crisis 
episode, we would expect an occurrence of banking crisis to be followed by improvements in 
disclosure and transparency – i.e., a positive relation between crisis probability and disclosure. 
Yet, our results so far indicate a robust negative relation between crisis vulnerability and 
disclosure; hence this type of reverse causality appears to be less of a concern. Another form of 
  27reverse causality might be the argument that banking fragility could lead to lower disclosure and 
transparency due to fears of greater instability from disclosing bank problems.  One can examine 
the possibility of both forms of reverse causality using instrumental variables to identify the 
exogenous component of bank disclosure.   
Based on theory and recent empirical works, I use the legal origin of countries as 
instruments.  La Porta et al. (1998) show that civil law countries tend to support government 
intervention relative to private property rights.  To the extent that disclosure regulations are 
government sanctions, their prevalence and characteristics could be partially dictated by the legal 
tradition of the country whereas the latter has little effect on the probability of crisis.  Legal 
origin has also been extensively used as an instrument in the finance-growth literature (see 
Levine (2003)) as well as in the banking crises literature (see, e.g., Barth et al. (2004)).  
I estimate an instrumental variables model with legal origin as instruments.  In the first 
stage regressions, the data does not reject the validity of the instruments. Columns (8) and (9) 
present the instrumental variables results.  They confirm the major findings in Table 3 through 
Table 5 that (i) greater bank disclosure lowers the likelihood of systemic banking crisis; and (ii) 
greater auditing stringency increases the likelihood of banking system stability.  Hence 
controlling for simultaneity via the instruments does not alter the major findings, suggesting that 
the results are less likely to be explained by reverse causality. 
V.  Conclusion 
 
While the history of banking crises stretches as far back as there has been banking 
systems, recent banking crises have been more frequent and costly.  The recurring financial 
crises of the late 1990s coupled with recent corporate scandals around the world have brought to 
  28the fore the public debate on the need for strengthening market discipline through greater 
disclosure and transparency.  
The role of disclosure to banking system stability is not well understood, however.  While 
the ‘disclosure-stability’ view holds that greater disclosure fosters stability through reducing 
informational asymmetries, the ‘disclosure-fragility’ view emphasizes the negative externalities 
that may be associated with greater disclosure and its potential to stymie stability.  Reflecting the 
theoretical debate, disclosure policies have not made significant inroads in bank regulations 
around the world despite calls for more transparency by concerned international policy makers. 
The paper examines the role of greater disclosure in fostering banking system stability.  
Based on data on a cross-section of forty-nine countries in the 1990s, the paper studies the 
impact of increased bank disclosure requirements and stronger auditing regulatory regimes on 
the likelihood of suffering systemic banking crisis.  
The study documents that greater disclosure and stringent external audit requirements are 
strongly associated with banking system stability. Specifically, the likelihood of systemic 
banking crisis is lower in countries with regulations that require more comprehensive  and 
accurate disclosure, and more stringent external auditing of bank reporting.  The impact of 
greater banking disclosure to banking stability appears also to be economically large.  The results 
indicate that greater disclosure results in significant savings in countries’ real output loss that is 
often associated with banking system instability. 
In policy terms, the findings provide empirical regularities consistent with the goals of 
the third pillar of the New Basal Capital Accord that aims to encourage market discipline by 
developing a set of disclosure requirements that allow market participants to assess bank risk 
positions and capital adequacy. The New Accord’s initiatives in requiring greater disclosure are 
  29consistent with the broader regulatory objectives of promoting banking system stability. The 
benefits of the specific recommendations of the initiative in the areas of supplemental reporting, 
consolidation, reporting risk methodologies, and frequency of reporting in fostering banking 
system stability are validated in the findings.  To further enhance the benefits of greater 
disclosure, the results emphasize the importance also of improving the credibility of reporting.  
While expanding the scope of bank disclosure, the New Accord does not provide verification 
requirements beyond those required for accounting reporting, and security registration.  The 
results underscore the value of external audit stringency in improving transparency and 
promoting bank stability.   
  30Appendix I: Systemic Banking Crises in the 1990s 
 
Country  Banking Crisis in 
1990s 
  
Country  Banking Crisis in 
1990s 
Australia   Japan  1992-97 
Austria   Jordan    1990 
Bahrain   Kenya  1993 
Belgium   Korea,  South  1997 
Botswana   Lesotho   
Burundi   Malaysia  1997 
Canada   Mauritania  1990-93 
Chile   Mexico 1994-97 
Denmark   Nepal   
El Salvador    Nigeria  1991-95 
Egypt   Pakistan     
Finland 1991-94  Peru  1990 
France   Philippines   
Germany   Portugal   
Ghana   Singapore   
Greece   Sri  Lanka 1990-93 
Guatemala   Sweden  1990-93 
Guyana 1993-95  Switzerland     
Honduras   Thailand  1997 
India 1991-97  Turkey  1991,  1994 
Indonesia 1992-97 United  Kingdom   
Ireland   U.S.A.   
Israel   Venezuela  1993-97 
Italy 1990-95  Zambia  
Jamaica 1996-97     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  31Appendix II: Definition of Main Variables 
 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variables: 
      
     Crisis   
 
 
 
Indicator variable that takes 1 if a country has undergone systemic banking crisis in the period 1990 through 1997. 
Explanatory Variables: 
 
     Bank Disclosure 
     
 
 
    
 
 
 
    Supplemental Reporting 
 
      
    Director Liability 
 
 
    External Audit Stringency 
 
 
 
 
     
 
    Auditor Liability  
 
 
 
A measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.  Its values are the principal 
component of four indicator variables: (i)  Presentation of Non-Performing Loans - a variable that takes 1 if bank regulation 
requires that accrued income on non-performing loans should not be reported; (ii) Reporting Consolidated Financial 
Statements - a variable that takes 1 if consolidated financial statements of bank and non-bank subsidiaries are required; (iii) 
Reporting Off-Balance-Sheet  to the Public - a variable that takes 1 if off balance sheet items are required to be disclosed to 
the public; and (iv) Reporting Risk Management Practice -  a variable that takes 1 if banks are required to disclose risk 
management practices to the public. 
 
 
A measure of the extent of supplementary information as required by countries’ banking regulation.  Its values are the 
principal component of variables in (iii) and (iv) above. 
 
 
 
A measure of the degree of legal sanctions against bank officials for nonperformance vis a vis the bank regulations. 
 
 
 
A measure of the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations 
governing audit practices.  The index is the principal component of five indicator variables:  (i) Compulsory Audit - a 
variable that takes 1 if external audit is compulsory in the country; (ii) Required Extent of Audit - a variable that assumes the 
value 1 if bank regulation sanctions the extent of the external audit; (iii) License Requirements - a variable that takes 1 if 
auditors are required to be licensed or certified; (iv) Auditor Report to Supervisor - a variable that takes 1 if auditors’ report 
should be given to the bank supervisory agency; and (v)Auditor Meet Supervisor without Consent of Bank -  a variable that 
takes 1 if the bank supervisory agency can meet the external auditors to discuss audit report without the consent of the bank 
auditee. 
  
A measure of the degree of legal sanctions against auditors in the case of nonperformance vis a vis the bank regulations. 
Control Variables:  
 
     Bank Concentration 
 
     
     Bank Competition 
 
 
     External Terms of Trade 
 
     Inflation  
  
     Per capita GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
The degree of concentration in the banking industry, measured as share of assets of the three largest banks in the country, 
averaged over the period 1990 through 1997.  
 
The degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, measured as the sum of elasticities bank revenue to changes in 
input prices from Cleassens and Laeven (2004)  
 
The logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country 
 
The logarithm of the average inflation rates 
 
The logarithm of real per capita GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  32Appendix III: Survey Questions on Auditing and Disclosure 
 
The table provides a shortened and condensed version of the original World Bank survey questions. 
 
1. Entry into Banking 
2. Ownership 
3. Capital 
4. Activities 
5. External Auditing Requirements 
 
5.1 Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? 
5.2 Are specific requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out? 
5.3 Are auditors licensed or certified? 
5.4 Do supervisors get a copy of the auditor's report? 
5.5 Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without 
the approval of the bank? 
5.6 Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 
5.7 Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 
5.8 Has action been taken against an auditor in the last 5 years? 
 
6. Internal Management/Organizational requirements 
7. Liquidity & Diversification Requirements 
8. Depositor (Savings) Protection Schemes 
9. Provisioning Requirements 
10. Accounting/Information Disclosure Requirements 
 
10.1 Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is still 
         performing? 
  10.1.1 Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is still 
non-performing? 
10.2 After how many days in arrears must interest income accrual cease? 
10.3 Are financial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-
bank financial subsidiaries? 
10.4 Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 
  10.4.1 Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public? 
10.5 Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to the public? 
10.6 Are bank directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous or misleading? 
  10.6.1 What are the penalties, if applicable? 
  10.6.2 Have penalties been enforced? 
10.7 Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks? 
  10.7.1 What percentage of the top ten banks are rated by international credit rating agencies (e.g. 
Moody's, Standard and Poor)?  
  10.7.2 How many of the top ten banks are rated by domestic credit rating agencies? 
  10.7.3 Which bank activities are rated? 
  10.7.3.1  Bonds? 
  10.7.3.2 Commercial paper? 
  10.7.3.3 Other activity (e.g., bank certificates of deposit, pension and mutual funds, insurance 
companies, financial guarantees, etc.)? 
 
11. Discipline/Problem Institutions/Exit 
12. Supervision 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  Variable  N Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum Maximum
Crisis  392    0.060  0.397 0  1.000 
Bank Disclosure  376          0.274 0.869 -1.800 1.935
Supplemental Reporting  392          0.272 0.841 -1.295 1.392
Presentation of Non-Performing 
Loans 
376          0.858 0.350 0 1.000
Reporting Consolidated Statements  368          0.879 0.326 0 1.000
Reporting Off-Balance Sheet 
To Public 
376          0.860 0.348 0 1.000
Reporting Risk Management Practice  376          0.329 0.471 0 1.000
Director Liability  377          0.011 1.105 -2.941 1.044
External Audit Stringency  313          0.024 1.124 -6.725 0.554
Compulsory Audit  313          0.981 0.137 0 1.000
Required Extent of Audit  313          0.709 0.455 0 1.000
License Requirement  313          0.981 0.137 0 1.000
Auditor Report to Supervisor  313          0.962 0.192 0 1.000
Auditor Meet Supervisor without 
consent of Bank 
313          0.709 0.455 0 1.000
Auditor Liability  392          0.013 0.924 -1.408 1.100
Bank Competition  282          0.649 0.104 0.410 0.860
Bank Concentration  392          0.715 0.219 0.190 1.000
External Terms of Trade  383          0.024 0.092 -0.189 0.232
Log of average Inflation  392          0.115 0.102 0.010 0.460
Per capita GDP  392          8.428 1.661 5.000 10.701
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    Crisis Bank
Disclosure 
  Supplemental 
Reporting 
External 
Audit 
Stringency 
Bank 
Concentration 
Bank 
Competition 
External 
Terms 
of Trade 
Inflation 
Bank 
Disclosure 
-0.00731 
(0.8885) 
          
Supplemental 
Reporting 
-0.0289 
(0.564) 
0.9225 
(0.0001) 
         
        
      
    
  
 
External Audit 
Stringency 
-0.26675 
(<0.0001) 
-0.19825 
(0.0001) 
-0.1507 
(0.0022) 
Bank 
Concentration 
0.05374 
(0.2041) 
0.05404 
(0.2999) 
0.0649 
(0.1901) 
0.29267 
(<.0001) 
Bank 
Competition 
-0.26343 
(<.0001) 
0.00250 
(0.9709) 
0.1972 
(0.0025) 
0.15144 
(0.0234) 
0.41617 
(<.0001) 
External Terms 
of Trade 
0.02583 
(0.6144) 
-0.30211 
(<.0001) 
-0.2675 
(0.0001) 
0.03622 
(0.5293) 
-0.06772 
(0.1860) 
-0.01916 
(0.7755) 
Inflation 0.01597  -0.37016 
(0.7432)  (<.0001) 
-0.4202 
(0.0001) 
0.20828 
(0.0002) 
0.09893 
(0.0420) 
0.29594 
(<.0001) 
-0.0122 
(0.8153) 
 
Per Capita 
GDP 
-0.13094 
(0.0069) 
0.42028 
(<.0001) 
0.3366 
(0.0001) 
-0.12436 
(0.0110) 
-0.25521 
(<.0001) 
-0.05737 
(0.3844) 
-0.3056 
(<.0001) 
-0.5267 
(<.0001) 
Numbers in parenthesis represent p-values. 
Table 2: Correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Bank Disclosure and Banking Crises 
 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The dependent variables is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value  
one if there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Bank Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the  
fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive conduct 
 in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of elasticities bank revenue to changes in input prices from Cleassens and Laeven (2004). External Terms of Trade  
is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate.  Bank Disclosure is a measure of the extent and 
comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.    Supplemental Reporting is a measure of the extent of supplementary information as required by countries’ banking regulation.   
Director Liability is a measure of the degree of legal sanctions against bank officials for nonperformance vis-à-vis the bank regulations. Presentation of Non-Performing Loans, Reporting  
Consolidated Financial Statements, Reporting Off-balance Sheet to Public, and Reporting Risk Management Practices are dummy variables that take the value one if the countries’ bank  
regulation requires the specific provision and the value zero otherwise.  Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.  
The sample period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
Panel A  Panel B   
1 2 3 4  5  6 7  8  9  10    11     
Bank 
Concentration 
 -3.463
b 
(1.394) 
 
-6.864
 b
(2.762) 
 
-7.483
 b
(3.1748) 
 
-7.934
 b
(3.684) 
 
-16.769
 b
(6.6486) 
 
-9.430
 b
(3.9420) 
 
-7.354 
(3.7751) 
 
-10.326
 b
(4.0849) 
 
-13.258
 a
(4.930) 
 
-8.002
 b
(3.497) 
 
Bank 
Competition  
 -3.377 
(1.912) 
 
-16.850
 b
(6.668) 
 
-16.075
 a
(5.7350) 
 
-16.025
 b
(6.748) 
 
-8.979
 a
(3.1899) 
 
-9.436
 a
(3.2311) 
 
-20.350
 b
(7.9479) 
 
-7.418
 b
(3.0532) 
 
-8.486
 a
(3.146) 
 
-17.458
 a
(6.112) 
 
External Terms 
of Trade 
-8.8716
 a
(2.175) 
 
 -22.109
 a
(5.738) 
 
-18.501
a
(5.2192) 
 
-15.757
 a
(4.996) 
 
-11.427
 a
(3.6296) 
 
-13.312
 a
(4.0093) 
 
-17.152
 a
(5.6095) 
 
-9.755
 a
(3.3507) 
 
-11.490
 a
(3.911) 
 
-22.029
 a
(6.143) 
 
Inflation 
-0.9026 
(1.794) 
 
 11.565
 a
(3.997) 
 
10.028
 a
(3.8654) 
 
7.720 
(3.877) 
 
15.070
 a
(5.6825) 
 
11.488
 a
(3.4984) 
 
9.6487
 b
(4.0308) 
 
8.895
 b  
(3.6492) 
 
13.14729
a
(4.4667) 
 
12.711
a
(4.719) 
 
Bank Disclosure 
 
-0.4776
 b
(0.225) 
 
-0.591
 b
(0.261) 
 
-3.889
 a
(1.056) 
 
-3.5191
 a
(0.9987) 
 
        -3.981
 a
(1.128) 
 
Supplemental 
Reporting  
     -3.113
 a
(0.967) 
 
         
Presentation of 
Non-Performing 
Loans 
       -2.4420 
(1.7923) 
 
       
Reporting 
Consolidated 
Statements 
         -1.934
c
(1.1137) 
 
     
Reporting Off-
Balance Sheet 
To Public 
          -4.7716
 a
(1.4379) 
 
   
Reporting Risk 
Management 
Practice 
            -1.1666 
(1.1066) 
 
  
Director 
Liability  
              -0.4617 
(0.4667) 
 
-0.7073 
(0.584) 
 
Per Capita  
GDP 
   -0.3790 
(0.2424) 
 
-0.834
 a
(0.245) 
 
-0.9381
 a
(0.3409) 
 
-0.2727 
(0.3366) 
 
-0.8290
 a
(0.2454) 
 
-0.7011
 a
(0.2404) 
 
-0.7376
 a
(0.2584) 
 
-0.2949 
(0.270) 
 
Model χ
2 19.985
 a
0.0002 
24.737
 a
<.0001 
81.897
 a
(<.0001) 
84.577
 a
(<.0001) 
85.366
 a
<.0001 
66.618
 a
(<.0001) 
70.8748
 a
(<.0001) 
83.664
 a
(<.0001) 
71.493
 a
(<.0001) 
67.789
 a
(<.0001) 
88.923
a 
(<.0001) 
% success 
68.2 71.2 92.0 93.3  94.0  90.5 91.7  93.5  91.5  91.1  93.1 
Pseudo R
2 0.086 0.119 0.5199  0.5369  0.532  0.4229  0.4420  0.4782  0.4459  0.418  0.462 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  39Table 4: External Audit Stringency and Banking Crises 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value 
one if there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Bank Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the 
fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive 
conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of elasticities bank revenue to changes in input prices from Cleassens and Laeven (2004). External Terms 
of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate. External Audit Stringency is a 
measure of the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations governing audit practices.  Bank Disclosure is a measure of the 
extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.     Auditor Liability is a measure of the degree of legal sanctions against auditors in the case of nonperformance 
vis-à-vis the bank regulations.  Required Extent of Audit, Auditor Report to Supervisor, and Auditor Meet Supervisor without Consent of Bank are dummy variables that take the value 
one if the countries’ bank regulation requires the specific provision and the value zero otherwise.  Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are 
standard errors.  The sample period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
Panel A  Panel B   
1 2 3  4  5  6  7 8  9  10 
Bank Concentration   -1.006 
(1.491) 
 
-5.357
b
(2.637) 
 
-19.342
 b
(7.8088) 
 
-6.7264 
(4.4331) 
 
-23.8571 
(17.0279) 
 
-16.774
b
(7.0253) 
 
-16.524
b
(6.6529) 
 
-12.027
 b
(4.667) 
 
-19.012
 b 
(7.385) 
 
Bank Competition    -4.512
 b
(2.141) 
 
-8.380
 b
(3.524) 
 
-10.806
 a
(3.9334) 
 
-18.417
 a
(6.6996) 
 
-14.573
 c
(8.3552) 
 
-10.589
 a
(3.8956) 
 
-8.152
 b
(3.4979) 
 
-8.343
 b
(3.345) 
 
-10.280
 a
(4.214) 
 
External Terms of 
Trade 
-7.422
a 
(2.155) 
 
 -10.252
 a
(3.378) 
 
-6.652
 c
(3.5002) 
 
-14.9872
 a
(5.0292) 
 
-0.00876 
(9.7175) 
 
-7.766
 b
(3.2688) 
 
-10.038
 a
(3.6057) 
 
-9.775
 a
(3.450) 
 
-6.433
 c 
(3.517) 
 
Log of Average 
Inflation 
2.713 
(1.645) 
 
 9.603
 a
(2.405) 
 
20.377
 a
(7.6006) 
 
12.0865
 a
(4.6049) 
 
26.8497 
(20.1855) 
 
17.212
 b
(6.8609) 
 
16.427
 a
(5.8772) 
 
11.0189
a
(4.1294) 
 
19.213
b 
(8.078) 
 
External Audit 
Stringency 
-0.704
 a
(0.215) 
 
-0.4623
 a
(0.1327) 
 
-0.3732 
(0.282) 
 
-0.985
 a
(0.3715) 
 
-0.7785
 b
(0.3373) 
 
      -0.9783
 a
(0.366) 
 
Bank Disclosure 
 
      -3.6350
 a
(1.1072) 
 
       
Required Extent of 
Audit 
        -2.9237 
(2.8774) 
 
      
Auditor Report to 
Supervisor 
          -3.5564
 a
(1.3024) 
 
    
Auditor Meet 
Supervisor without 
consent of Bank 
            -1.361
 b
(0.7042) 
 
  
Auditor Liability                0.0422 
(0.5895) 
 
0.1990 
(0.707) 
 
Per Capita 
GDP 
    -1.449
 a
(0.538) 
 
-0.7507
 a
(0.3761) 
 
-1.6103 
(1.1767) 
 
-1.4607
 a
(0.5273) 
 
-0.8725
 a
(0.3364) 
 
-0.7458
 a
(0.2741) 
 
-1.435
 a
(0.513) 
 
Model χ
2 25.768
 a
<.0001 
38.017
 a
<.0001 
58.149
 a
<.0001 
76.378
 a
(<.0001) 
90.8366
 a
(<.0001) 
69.918
 a
(<.0001) 
76.989
 a
(<.0001) 
71.783
 a
(<.0001) 
67.578
 a
(<.0001) 
81.699
a 
(<.0001) 
% success  69.6 75.5 89.4  91.2  94.8  91.9  92.1 92.2  91.0  92.2 
Pseudo R
2 0.106 0.181 0.363  0.476  0.5277  0.4361 0.4802  0.4477  0.421  0.400 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  40Table 5:  Robustness Tests: Additional Controls 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value one if there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Growth 
in GDP is rato of growth in real GDP. Real interest rate is nominal interest rate less contemporaneous rate of inflation. M2/reserve is ratio of the M2 to 
international reserves. Restriction of Entry is number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number of applications for bank license from Barth et 
al. (2001). Activity Restrictions is an index of whether bank activities in securities, insurance and real estate markets restricted from Barth et al. (2001). 
Banking Freedom is an indicator of relative openness of banking and financial systems from Barth et al (2001). State Ownership is percentage of banking 
system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more government owned from Barth  et al. (2001).  The regressions also include the following variables. Bank 
Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country 
averaged over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of 
elasticities bank revenue to changes in input prices from Cleassens and Laeven (2004). External Terms of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index 
to import price index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate. External Audit Stringency is a measure of the degree to which external audits are 
independent, professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations governing audit practices.  Bank Disclosure is a measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial 
reporting required of banks.  Crisis in 80s Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the country has undergone a systemic banking crisis in the 1980s and the value 
zero otherwise.  Explicit Deposit Insurance is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the country has an explicit deposit fixed-premium deposit insurance scheme and the 
value zero otherwise.  Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The sample period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed 
variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
Panel A  Panel B   
1 2  3 4  5 6  7 8  9 10 11 
Growth in GDP  0.575
(0.376) 
   0.929
 
(0.604) 
           
Real Interest 
Rate 
  0.0014
 
(0.083) 
 -0087 
(0.119) 
           
M2/ Reserve 
Ratio 
   -0.095 
(0.115) 
-0.119
 
(0.088) 
           
Restriction to 
Entry 
      16.946
 a
(5.774) 
     9.495
 b
(4.498) 
   
Restriction of 
Bank Activity 
        0.512
 a
(0.149) 
     0.528
 a
(0.186) 
 
Bank Freedom           - 1 . 5 9 1
b 
(0.503) 
    
State Ownership             4.483
 a
(1.640) 
4.259 
(2.850) 
2.658
 b
(1.406) 
 
Explicit Deposit 
Insurance 
                1.540 
(1.461) 
Bank Disclosure  -4.523
 a 
(1.243) 
-4.949
 b
(0.971) 
-4.483
 a
(1.243) 
-3.694
 c
(2.045) 
-2.079
 a
(0.600) 
-1.562
 a
(0.541) 
-1.542
 a
(0.555) 
-1.104
 a
(0.460) 
-1.620
 a
(0.557) 
-1.179
 b
(0.640) 
-3.167
a 
(1.084) 
External Audit 
Stringency 
-0.835
b
(384) 
-0.436
 b
(0.212) 
-0.921
 b
(0.316) 
-1.666
 a
(0.464) 
-1.605
a
(0.444) 
-0.507
 c
(0.305) 
-0.313
  
(0.288) 
 
-0.709
 a
(0.261)
 
-1.272
 a
(0.376) 
-0.456
 c
(0.275) 
-2.751
a 
(0.797) 
Model χ
2 89.057
a 
(<.0001) 
90.77
 a
<.0001 
89.72
 a 
<.0001 
92.56
 a 
(<.0001) 
39.74
 a 
(<.0001) 
55.48
a 
(<.0001 
58.18
 a 
<.0001 
41.44
 a 
(<.0732) 
59.18
a 
(<.0001) 
60.47
a 
(<.0001) 
92.09
a 
(0.001) 
% success  95.4 95.0  94.7 93.9  88.4 88.2  85.4 83.5  89.8  89.4  95.2 
Pseudo R 
2 0.40  0..39  0.42  0.45 0.57  0.66  0.66  0.69 0.58 0.63 0.59 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
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Table 6:  Robustness Tests:  Sensitivity to changes in Methodology 
 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The estimates under column (7) are maximum likelihood estimates of a 
random effects model with random country and year effects. The coefficient estimates of the country and year effects are not reported.  The estimates in 
column (8) and (9) are estimates of  two stage instrumental variables models, where countries’ legal origins are used as instruments. The dependent 
variable is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value one if there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Bank Concentration is 
a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged over the 
sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of elasticities bank revenue 
to changes in input prices from Cleassens and Laeven (2004). External Terms of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a 
country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate. External Audit Stringency is a measure of the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and 
rigorous as reflected in bank regulations governing audit practices.  Bank Disclosure is a measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.  
Crisis in 80s Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the country has undergone a systemic banking crisis in the 1980s and the value zero otherwise.  Explicit 
Deposit Insurance is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the country has an explicit deposit fixed-premium deposit insurance scheme and the value zero otherwise.  
Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The sample period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are 
given in Appendix II. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(RE) 
8 
IV 
9 
IV 
Bank Concentration  -20.464
a 
(6.2325) 
 
-21.484
b 
(8.8770) 
 
-22.3606
a 
(6.9441) 
 
4.1210
c 
(2.3965) 
 
0.3510 
(7.1482) 
 
6.4004
b 
(3.1137) 
 
0.3854 
(1.573) 
 
-2.1634 
(1.531) 
 
-2.1585 
(1.5314) 
 
Bank Competition  -29.5716
b 
(14.1675) 
 
-11.1511
a 
(4.0093) 
 
-24.6885
b 
(10.1235) 
 
-9.1419
a 
(3.5171) 
 
-11.9331 
(8.1550) 
 
-12.3598
a 
(4.0134) 
 
-5.9483
a
(2.265) 
 
-16.459
a 
(4.525) 
 
-16.393
a 
(4.5609) 
 
External Terms of 
Trade 
-44.0846
b 
(18.5030) 
 
-5.6872 
(3.7396) 
 
-36.4107
a 
(13.8346) 
 
-3.5655 
(3.2484) 
 
-7.3000 
(6.3557) 
 
-7.4815
c 
(4.2367) 
 
-7.6247
 a 
(2.628) 
 
-2.5983 
(3.025) 
 
-2.6190 
(3.0308) 
 
Inflation  31.8420
b 
(12.4148) 
 
22.9841
a 
(8.7937) 
 
31.8411
a 
(10.0900) 
 
-2.4940 
(2.7385) 
 
6.9267 
(6.6802) 
 
-4.2299 
(2.9737) 
 
-0.0050 
(2.6726) 
 
4.6521
c 
(2.433) 
 
4.6338
c 
(2.4374) 
 
Bank Disclosure 
- Alternative 
-7.6168
b 
(3.2857) 
 
 -6.8749
a 
(2.537) 
 
      
External Audit 
Stringency - 
Alternative 
 -1.0738
b 
(0.4556) 
 
-0.8414
b 
(0.4048) 
 
      
Bank Disclosure      -3.1645
a 
(0.5984) 
 
-2.5155
c 
(1.4507) 
 
-4.9436
a 
(1.5489) 
 
-0.6537
b 
(0.3270) 
 
-3.6860
b 
(1.526) 
 
 
 
 
External Audit 
Stringency 
    -2.0935
a 
(0.4826) 
 
-1.5593
c 
(0.9440) 
 
-2.7507
a 
(0.7968) 
 
-0.6428
 b 
(0.2707) 
 
 
 
 
-1.0180
b 
(0.4215) 
 
Crisis in 80s Dummy        -1.9282 
(1.3406) 
 
   
Per capita GDP  -0.00646 
(0.4747) 
 
-1.4008
b 
(0.5488) 
 
-0.3434 
(0.4835) 
 
-1.5096
a 
(0.3010) 
 
-1.0991
c 
(0.5832) 
 
-2.1154
a 
(0.5896) 
 
-0.3647 
(0.2509) 
 
-0.6021
a 
(0.207) 
 
-0.5998
a 
(0.2075) 
 
Model χ
2 95.0770
a 
(<.0001) 
74.5921
a 
(<.0001) 
100.2814
a 
(<.0001) 
74.4796
a 
(<.0001) 
11.5356
a 
(<.0732) 
126.7186
a 
(<.0001) 
527.6
a 
(<.0001) 
55.2715
a 
(<.0001) 
49.2495
a 
(<.0001) 
% success  94.7 92.4 96.0 93.3 95.8 93.3 NA 86.9 85.5 
Pseudo R 
2 0.5930 0.4652 0.6224 0.3383 0.2607 0.5755  NA  0.239  0.2845 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
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